Great Depression And Macroeconomic Policy

 

INTRODUCTION

The central point of this essay will imply to some considerations towards different views of economists on the role of macroeconomics policy making in the recovery of the American economy in the pre 1942 period. First and foremost, proponent Christina D. Romer (1992, p. 758) has argued that "there is cause to believe that aggregate demand developments, particularly monetary changes, were important in fostering recovery from the Great Depression" in the United States. Ideally, Romer have examine the role of aggregate-demand stimulus in ending the Great Depression, there has been plausible estimates of the effects of fiscal and monetary changes indicate that nearly all the observed recovery of the U.S. economy prior to 1942 was due to monetary expansion.

Further, there was huge gold inflow in the middle as well as later of 1930s swelled the money stock and stimulated the economy by lowering real interest rates and encouraging investment spending and purchases of durable goods. Thus, recognizing facts that monetary developments were crucial to the recovery implies that self-correction played little role in the growth of real output between the year 1933 and 1942 respectively.

DISCUSSIONS

Notably, there has been sources of high rates of real growth during great depression recovery as the conventional wisdom is that the US economy remained depressed for all of 1930s and returned to full employment from the second world war outbreak. Indeed, great depression does not seem to provide evidence that large shocks are undone by forces of mean reversion. Rather, great depression suggests that large negative shifts in aggregate demand as followed by positive shifts, combination of latter leaves the economy back on trend. (Romer, 1992 p. 783) Aside, ‘Smithies (1946, p. 12) asserts that the fiscal policy did prove to be an effective and only effective means to recovery as more of faith than evidence on the other hand, Hansen (1941, p. 84) argues that fiscal policy was not used extremely in the year 1930s, Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 511) stress that Federal Reserve policy was not source of recovery from the depression as the Federal Reserve System made no attempt to alter the quantity of high powered money by using instruments as major reliance up to 1933, clearly aware that other developments such as new deal policy led to money supply during the same year furthermore, Friedman and Schwartz as there intentions on castigating the federal reserve for inaction that this monetary expansion receives attention’. – (Romer, 1992 pp. 757-759)

Henceforth, there place certain policy inaction as well as ineffectiveness have led to modern economists to assume that conventional aggregate demand stimulus could have not mattered in the great depression recovery, Bernanke and Parkinson (1989, p. 212) believed that new deal policy is better characterized as having cleared way for natural recovery rather than being engine of the recovery in itself, as such trend reversion of the interwar economy is evidence of a strong self corrective force. Thus, De Long and Summers (1988, p. 467) have thought that the aggregate demand policy have contributed to the recovery of Second World War and have concluded that it is hard to attribute any of the pre 1942 catch up of the economy to the war. (Romer, 1992 pp. 757-759) In addition, as Romer (1992, p. 782) pointed out, monetary changes were important to the recovery as fiscal policy had little effect as real GNP have approximately 25 percent lower in 1937 and 50 percent lower in 1942 and had money supply continued to grow at average rate.

The great depression assume global based economic downturn that have started in the year 1929 and ended for about year 1930 and over, the depression then was the longest and severe depression duly experienced by the Western world wherein industrialized areas are affected mostly the US and neighboring nations as well being the fact that great depression came original in United States, truly then the great depression have resulted drastic macroeconomic declines in such business oriented outputs as well as unemployment and such rapid yet acute deflation in almost every country, global. However, depression’s social and cultural effects were no less staggering, in the United States, wherein great depression ranks second only to US civil war being the gravest crisis of the American history.

The connotation that great depression was long and severe in US and Europe but quite mild in Japan but much of Latin America. Perhaps, worst depression ever experienced stemmed from multitude of causes. Declines in consumer demand, financial panics as well as unguided and misguided government policies that have caused economic output to fall in the US. Presence of the gold standard which linked nearly to other countries in network of fixed currency exchange rates, played key role in transmitting American downturn to other countries like in European areas. The recovery from great depression have spurred through the abandonment of the gold standard as well as the ensuing monetary expansion and indeed, great depression brought in essential changes in economic institutions, the economic theories and the macroeconomic policy along the way. Further, the recovery began in spring of 1933 as output grew rapidly and that real GDP rose at an average rate of nine percent per year during the time of 1933 and 1937, as output had fallen so deeply in 1930s, however depression have remained substantially below its long run trend level throughout the 1942 period.

Generally, United States suffered another severe downturn, the American economy grew more rapidly as compared to the middle of 1930s. There implies that US output finally returned to its long based trend level in 1942. Depression have made British economy stopped declining soon after Britain’s abandonment of the gold standard in September 1931, though genuine recovery did not begin until the end of 1932. The economies of number of Latin American countries began to strengthen in late 1931 and early 1932. Germany and Japan both began to recover in the fall of 1932. Canada and many smaller European countries started to revive in 1933 France, which experienced severe depression later time did not firmly enter the recovery phase until 1938. However, stock market crash reduced American aggregate demand as consumer purchases of durable goods and business investment fell sharply after the crash, financial crisis generated considerable uncertainty about future income, which in turn led consumers and firms to put off purchases of durable goods. Although the loss of wealth caused by the decline in stock prices was relatively small, the crash may also have depressed spending by making people feel poorer.

There was drastic decline in consumer and firm spending, real output in the United States, which had been declining slowly up to this point, fell rapidly in late 1929 and throughout 1930. Thus, while the Great Crash of the stock market and the great depression are two quite separate events, the decline in stock prices was one factor causing the decline in production and employment in the United States. Furthermore, several scholars believe that such declines in the money supply caused by Federal Reserve decisions had severe concretionary effect on output. Thus, one simple picture provides perhaps the clearest evidence of the key role monetary collapse played in the Great Depression in the United States, the decline in the money supply depressed spending in number of ways.  

Perhaps because of actual price declines and the rapid decline in the money supply, consumers and business people came to expect deflation that is, they expected wages and prices to be lower in the future. The outcome places nominal interest rates were very low, people did not want to borrow because they feared that future wages and profits would be inadequate to cover the loan payments. There led to severe reductions in consumer spending and business investment spending, some panics surely exacerbated the decline in spending by generating pessimism and loss of confidence. Aside, failure of so many banks disrupted lending, thereby reducing the funds available to finance investment. In addition, some economists believe that the Federal Reserve allowed or caused the huge declines in the American money supply partly to preserve the gold standard.

Under the gold standard, each country set value of its currency in terms of gold and took monetary actions to defend the fixed price. It is possible that had the Federal Reserve expanded greatly in response to the banking panics, foreigners could have lost confidence in the United States’ commitment to the gold standard. This could have led to large gold outflows and the United States could have been forced to devalue. Likewise, had the Federal Reserve not tightened in the fall of 1931, it is possible that there would have been speculative attack on the dollar and the Unites States would have been forced to abandon the gold standard along with Great Britain.

While there is debate about the role the gold standard played in limiting US monetary policy, there is no question that it was key factor in the transmission of the American decline to the rest of the world. Under the gold standard, imbalances in trade or asset flows gave rise to international gold flows. For example, in 1920s intense international demand for American assets such as stocks and bonds brought large inflows of gold to the United States. High interest rates depressed British spending and led to high unemployment in Great Britain throughout the second half of the 1920s. Once the U.S. economy began to contract severely, the tendency for gold to flow out of other countries and toward the United States intensified because deflation in United States made American goods particularly desirable to foreigners, while low income reduced American demand for foreign products. To counteract the resulting tendency toward an American trade surplus and foreign gold outflows, central banks throughout the world raised interest rates.

Maintaining the international gold standard, in essence, required massive monetary contraction throughout the world to match the one occurring in the United States, there were decline in output and prices in countries throughout the world that also nearly matched the downturn in the United States. Foreign lending reduction as result of high interest rates and the booming stock market in the United States. Thus, the reduction in foreign lending may have led to further credit contractions and declines in output in borrower countries for example in Germany, which experienced extremely rapid inflation, monetary authorities may have hesitated to undertake expansionary policy to counteract the economic slowdown because they worried it might ignite again inflation. The effects of reduced foreign lending may explain why the economies of Germany, Argentina and Brazil turned down before the Great Depression began in the United States. 

The 1930 enactment of the Smoot-Hawley tariff in the United States and the worldwide rise in protectionist trade policies created other complications. The Smoot-Hawley tariff was meant to boost farm incomes by reducing foreign competition in agricultural products. But other countries followed suit, both in retaliation and in an attempt to force correction of trade imbalances. Scholars now believe that these policies may have reduced trade somewhat, but were not significant cause of the depression in the large industrial producers. Protectionist policies may have contributed to the extreme decline in the world price of raw materials, which caused severe balance of payments problems for commodity producing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America and led to concretionary policies.

The economic impact of the great depression was human suffering as world output and standards of living dropped precipitously. As much as one fourth of the labor force in industrialized countries was unable to find work in the early 1930s. While conditions began to improve by the mid-1930s, total recovery was not accomplished until the end of the decade. Depression and the policy response also changed the world economy in crucial ways. The Great Depression hastened, if not caused, the end of the international gold standard. Although  system of fixed currency exchange rates was reinstated after World War II under the Bretton Woods system, the economies of the world never embraced that system with the conviction and fervor they had brought to the gold standard. By 1973, fixed exchange rates were abandoned in favor of floating rates. Both labor unions and the welfare state expanded substantially during the 1930s. In the United States, union membership more than doubled between 1930 and 1940.

The United States established unemployment compensation and old age and survivors’ insurance through the Social Security Act (1935), which was passed in response to the hardships of the 1930s. It is uncertain whether these changes would have eventually occurred in the United States without the Depression. Many European countries had experienced significant increases in union membership and had established government pensions before the 1930s. Both of these trends, however, accelerated in Europe during the Depression.

In many countries, government regulation of the economy, especially of financial

markets, increased substantially during the Great Depression. The United States, for example, established the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1934 to regulate new stock issues and stock market trading practices.

The Depression played crucial role in the development of macroeconomic policies intended to temper economic downturns and upturns. The central role of reduced spending and monetary contraction in the Depression led British economist John Maynard Keynes to develop the ideas in his General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money in the year (1936). Keynes’s theory suggested that increases in government spending, tax cuts, and monetary expansion could be used to counteract depressions. This insight, combined with growing consensus that government should try to stabilize employment, has led to much more activist policy since the 1930s. Legislatures and central banks throughout the world now routinely attempt to prevent or moderate recessions. Whether such change would have occurred without the Depression is again unanswerable question.

What is clear is that monetary change has made it unlikely that decline in spending will ever be allowed to multiply and spread throughout the world as it did during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Thus, part of the explanation for why the Federal Reserve did so little to counter the financial panics and economic decline was that it was fighting to defend the gold standard and maintain the prevailing fixed exchange rate. During 1933, Roosevelt temporarily suspended the convertibility to gold and let the dollar depreciate substantially. When team went back on gold at the new higher price, large quantities of gold flowed into the US Treasury from abroad. Under gold standard, the Treasury could increase the money supply without going through the Federal Reserve. It was allowed to issue gold certificates, which were interchangeable with Federal Reserve notes money supply were narrow as currency and reserves grew by reasonable percentage. Indeed, consumers and businesses wanted to sit on any cash they had because they expected its real purchasing power to increase as prices fell. Devaluation followed by rapid monetary expansion broke deflationary spiral. Expectations of rapid deflation were replaced by expectations of price stability or inflation brought real interest rates down. The change in the real cost of borrowing and investing appears to have had beneficial impact on consumer and firm behavior. The first thing that turned around was interest-sensitive spending. For example, car sales surged in the summer of 1933. One sign that lower real interest rates were crucial is that real fixed investment and consumer spending on durables both rose between 1933 and 1934, while consumer spending on services barely budged.

In the journal/article, ‘What Caused the Great Depression?’, written by Caldwell and O'Driscoll salient points towards great depression in relevance to economy has been noted down and some of the views were realized (see below)  

“Economists and historians have struggled for almost 80 years to account for the American great depression which began in 1929 and lasted until the early years of World War II. The depth of great depression was unprecedented as in March of 1933, more than one quarter of willing workers in the United States were unemployed, and another quarter could find only part-time work. Although conditions improved after this low point, high rates of unemployment continued to haunt the economy for many years”. – Caldwell and O'Driscoll (2007, p. 70)

“Depressions occur when there is not enough demand for all the goods and services that an economy produces. Inventories of unsold goods build up, and manufacturers cut production by buying less of the raw materials that they use to make their products. Service providers, from doctors to hair stylists, have fewer clients, and their incomes fall”. – Caldwell and O'Driscoll (2007, p. 70)

“Most economists believe that such falling demand is normal part of what is commonly called a "business cycle." Demand for two kinds of goods--durable goods and capital goods--tends to fluctuate, and these fluctuations drive the cycle. Durable goods are consumer goods that last a long time, such as automobiles, appliances, and home furnishings. Demand for such goods increases when consumers are feeling prosperous; it falls when they are not feeling prosperous. Also believe that durable goods markets can be "saturated"--that there are, in other words, times when most consumers have purchased the durables that they want and have no desire to buy more. At such times, demand obviously will fall”. – Caldwell and O'Driscoll (2007, p. 70)

“Aside, economists believe demand will reverse durable goods eventually wear out and must be replaced. To supply new goods for consumers seeking replacements, manufacturers purchase new equipment, rehire workers, and increase their purchase of raw materials. Total demand stayed low. Business firms continued to lay off employees, and many firms went bankrupt. Then, in 1930, banks began to fail in large numbers, wiping out the savings of potential buyers and further lowering demand”. – Caldwell and O'Driscoll (2007, p. 70)

“Mainstream economists had held that, if demand for products fell, the demand of business firms for money to finance new production would also fall. When demand for loans fell, interest rates would go down. According to the accepted economic theory, lower interest rates would encourage business firms to borrow more and increase production, which, in turn, would employ more workers. An increase in the number of employed workers would mean more consumer spending, which would make increased government spending unnecessary. Only when the American government began to increase spending in preparation for World War II did unemployment begin to fall to normal levels”. – Caldwell and O'Driscoll (2007, p. 70)

Crucini and Kahn (1996) argue that this trade  disruption may have produced an appreciable effect on the US economy, particularly if the elasticity of substitution between domestically produced inputs and imported inputs was very low. Against this argument Cole and Ohanian (1999) note that the United States was at that time a relatively closed economy, with trade comprising relatively low share, roughly balanced between imports and exports. Presence of tariffs suggests that, even if an important part of US imports were intermediate goods, they probably had a high elasticity of substitution with domestic intermediate goods; consequently, international trade disruptions probably had no appreciable or enduring negative effects on the US great depression. Public expenditure and distorting taxes.

Cole and Ohanian (1999) report data showing that trended public expenditure in the USA declined significantly only in 1933. It remained above the trend level during almost the entire decade. So negative crowding out effect of public expenditure has to be dismissed as far as taxes are concerned, the authors assert that tax rates on factors’ income changed during 1929 up to 1933, but considerably more later on. Given the distorting nature of income tax, it can be imagined that a tax increase may have had some negative impact on the economy. Using data on the average marginal tax rates on factors’ income, Cole and Ohanian (1999) run two further simulations: the first with the 1929 average tax level, the second with the 1939 average tax level. In the second simulation the steady-state level of labor input is 4 percent lower than in the first.

The authors concluded that negative fiscal policy shocks did not produce appreciable effects on the year 1929 to 1933 crisis, but they can explain some 20 percent of the weak during 1934 to 1939 recovery. Accordingly,  “monetary” shocks, financial disruptions and nominal rigidities are also considered to have had little impact on the Great Depression. The argument on this point is developed in detail by the same authors in another paper (Cole and Ohanian (2000), where in depth view of the role of deflation induced by monetary shocks in determining the 1929-1933 downturn within an RBC framework is provided. Cole and Ohanian (2000) review the main mechanisms identified by economists to explain the observed pattern of the real effects of monetary policy during the 1930s, namely:

-       Lucas and Rapping’s (1969) unexpected deflation model, by which an unexpected monetary restriction would lead to lower labor supply, insofar as workers, having adaptive expectations, always expect that the deflation of prices and monetary wages will no longer exist in the next period, respond to unexpected deflation by lowering their labor supply

-       the debt deflation model of Irving Fisher (1933), by which deflation, by making the burden of real debts heavier, would cause firms’ bankruptcies, and collapse in demand

-       the hypothesis in the presence of nominal wage rigidities, decrease in prices would induce an increase in real wages, thus causing decrease in the labor demand

-       theories centered on the role of banking disruptions induced by deflation, that would have caused the efficiency of financial intermediation to decrease and a consequent decrease in lending and output (Bernanke (1983)

There is the question of whether the “normality assumption” makes sense for the analysis of period like the US great depression. Under the equilibrium hypothesis, the normality assumption implies that, during an economic cycle, deflation process is the re-equilibrating market reaction to shock. In other words, under the equilibrium hypothesis, the normality assumption implies that deflation should have led the economy back towards the stationary equilibrium. The observation that this back to trend movement did not seem to happen until the early 1940s leads us to conclude that a further negative external intervention must have been at work in worsening things. Hence, the accusation of the New Deal policies. The point is that the logical premise of this reasoning, such as for example, the normality assumption, seems to be at variance with the general perception of phenomenon like the Great Depression.

‘The colonial nationalists either organized non-violent freedom movements or rose in sporadic rebellions which were readily suppressed by the colonial rulers. In their understandable anger, the colonial nationalists sometimes called their rulers fascists. Jawaharlal Nehru, in particular, who was influenced by European socialism and hated fascism, tried to see the system of colonial rule in a world context and stated that it was ‘fascist’. In this, he was thinking more about the symptoms of repressive colonial rule than of the nature of fascism as a populist movement. But if one considers all repressive regimes defending a status quo as ‘fascist’ one does not contribute to an understanding of the true nature of fascism’. – (Rothermund, 1996 p. 138)

There postulates that markets work well, while most contemporary observers viewed the deflation as clear sign of market failure (Garratay, 1986). A definitive assessment of the RBC interpretation of the Great Depression should start by investigating what normal business cycle is.  Indeed, to understand the great depression is the Holy Grail of macroeconomics. Not only did the Depression give birth to macroeconomics as distinct field of study, but an extent that is not always fully appreciated the experience of the 1930s continues to influence macroeconomists' beliefs, policy recommendations, and research agendas practicalities aside, finding an explanation for the worldwide economic collapse of the 1930s remains fascinating intellectual challenge.

The recent development has been change in the focus of Depression research, from traditional emphasis on events in the United States to more comparative approach that examines the experiences of many countries simultaneously, broadening of focus is important for two reasons first, agreeing with Romer (1993) that shocks to the domestic US economy were primary cause of both the American and world depressions, no account of the Great Depression would be complete without an explanation of the worldwide nature of the event, and of the channels through which deflationary forces spread among countries. Secondly, effectively expanding the data set from one observation to twenty or more, the shift to comparative perspective substantially improves our ability to identify in strict econometric sense-the forces responsible for the world depression. Because of its potential to bring the profession toward agreement on the causes of great depression, in consequence, to greater consensus on the central issues of contemporary macroeconomics having important benefit of several approaches.

It was being observed that the money supply, output and prices all fell precipitously in the contraction and rose rapidly in the recovery; the difficulty lay in establishing the causal links among these variables. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) presented monetarist interpretation of these observations, arguing that the main lines of causation ran from monetary contraction the result of poor policy-making and continuing crisis in the banking system-to declining prices and output. Opposing Friedman and Schwartz, Temin have contended that much of the monetary contraction in fact reflected passive response of money to output; and that the main sources of the Depression lay on the real side of the economy (Choudhri and Kochin 1980; Eichengreen 1984; Eichengreen and Sachs 1985; Hamilton 1988; Temin 1989; Bernanke and James 1991; Eichengreen 1992). To some extent the proponents of these two views argued past each other, with monetarists stressing the monetary sources of the latter stages of the Great Contraction and antimonetarists emphasizing the likely importance of nonmonetary factors in the initial downturn.

There was reasonable compromise position, adopted by many economists, was that both monetary and nonmonetary forces were operative at various stages (Gordon and Wilcox 1981). New body of research on the Depression has emerged which focuses on the operation of the international gold standard during the interwar period (Choudhri and Kochin 1980; Eichengreen 1984; Eichengreen and Sachs 1985; Hamilton 1988; Temin 1989; Bernanke and James 1991; Eichengreen 1992). Thus, countries adhering to the international gold standard suffered largely unintended and unanticipated declines in their inside money stocks in the late 1920s and early 1930s. There were declines in inside money stocks, particularly in the year 1931 and later, as it was being influenced by macroeconomic conditions but hardly continuous, passive responses to changes in output. Instead, money supplies evolved in response to financial and exchange rate crises, crises whose roots in turn lay primarily in the political and economic conditions.

Thus, there seems reasonable to characterize these monetary shocks as exogenous with respect to contemporaneous output, suggesting significant causal role for monetary forces in the world depression (Choudhri and Kochin 1980; Eichengreen 1984; Eichengreen and Sachs 1985; Hamilton 1988; Temin 1989; Bernanke and James 1991; Eichengreen 1992). However, even stronger evidence for the role of nominal factors in the Depression is provided by comparison of the experiences of countries that continued to adhere to the gold standard with those that did not. Because countries leaving gold effectively removed the external constraint on monetary deflation, to the extent that they took advantage of this freedom we should observe these countries enjoying earlier and stronger recoveries than the countries remaining on the gold standard. Choudhri and Kochin (1980), found that the gold standard countries suffered substantially more severe contractions in output and prices than did Spain and the three Scandinavian nations. In another important paper, Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) examined number of macro variables in a sample of ten major countries over the period 1929 to 1935 as the latter found that by 1935 countries that had left gold relatively early had largely recovered from the depression, while the Gold Bloc countries remained at low levels of output and employment.

Bernanke and James (1991) confirmed the general findings of the earlier authors for a broader sample of twenty four (industrialized) countries, and Campa (1990) did the same for sample of Latin American countries. In some countries, many wages and prices were either directly controlled by the government so that change involved administrative or legislative action, with the usual lags, or were highly politicized. Complex, decentralized economies also no doubt faced serious problems of coordination, both internally and with other economies, an issue that has been the subject of recent theoretical work (Cooper 1990).

Comparative international approach holds the most promise for improving understanding of the sources of incomplete nominal adjustment, share of the workforce employed by the government and so on. For the outset, Great Depression appeared to be an ordinary, though sharp, recession (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963). Most economic indicators had declined almost continuously from August 1929 until the end of 1930. Although consumers and investors seem to have become unusually uncertain after the 1929 stock market crash (Romer, 1990), many businessmen seemed to believe that it would be only short contraction. In retrospect, as the only relief from decline was an increase in industrial production and personal income in the first quarter of 1931. Mirroring positive outlook of some business leaders, to remain extraordinarily optimistic into greatest economic recession of twentieth century.

Himmelberg (2001, p. 5) quoted, “ the disposition of Americans to adjust their consumption patterns and to accept new products often needed little encouragement, but it was assisted and heightened by a thriving advertising industry that adopted the newer and more high-powered techniques for manipulating consumers we are familiar with today. A wider availability of consumer credit, “buying on the installment plan,” was still another reason for the propensity of most Americans to spend at a high rate on consumer goods during the 1920s”.

Himmelberg (2001) indicated further that, “Hoover’s efforts failed, and he is to this day held up to contempt as one who could not escape the bounds of the past and offer the inspired, experimental leadership that Roosevelt is credited with giving. This contempt stems from the bitterness many depression generation Americans felt toward one whose standing and accomplishments promised so much when the nation elected him by a landslide majority in 1928, but whose leadership during the massive economic downturn of 1929–1932 offered such paltry results.  In the decades following the depression, historians portrayed Hoover as a conservative in the tradition of the mainstream politicians who dominated the Republican Party, and national politics, during the 1920s. Hoover did rely, as the conservatives did, on the principles of low taxes, budget control, and minimal government regulation of business, but, unlike Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge, the Republican presidents of the 1920s, whom (p.33) ‘he served as secretary of commerce, Hoover believed the national government should play a major and active role in enhancing the economic and social welfare of the people. (Himmelberg 2001, p. 34)

CONCLUSION

Therefore, great depression should serve as an eye opener to the American economy to always bounce back on the hard times and survive the pitfalls of time and probably consider pre 1942 situation as an integral awakening of the present and be ready for the macroeconomic changes of the future wherein aggregate demand policy matters along with plausible events of the society. There is a need for US to control on the capital markets and its structures and not to be affected by the long term impact of the depression, leave the past struggles and allow better opportunities to come in.

Truly, embracing full strength of economic activities and accompany economists to always adhere to the conventional wisdom, striking the spotlight brought about by the recovery presence of great depression during the year 1930s and beyond. Moreover, there is imperative stature towards monetary changes as it is just on the right note placing after second world war and that great depression calls for change, change America for the betterment of its people, working in accordance to economic conditions of today’s epoch.

 

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